 |
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| The
Horn of African Oil Exploration Activities;
Somalia, Djibouti and the Somali State of
Ethiopia
Is
there Oil and Gas in Somalia, Is It Happening Here
?
|
| By
Charles
H. Featherstone
-Compiled
by: Eng. Ahmad Yusuf -MA (
Regional Oil and Gas expert) |
|
| |
| |
 |
|
| Ethiopia
Somali Zone: Natural
Resources small
reserves of gold, platinum, copper,
potash, natural gas, hydropower.
Somalia: Natural
Resources uranium
and largely unexploited reserves of iron
ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt.
Djibouti: Natural
Resources geothermal
areas. |
|
|
| HAN,
23 Sept. 2004 Washington Office ( Oil and
Gas compiled by: Eng. Ahmad Yusuf -MA
-France 1982 |
|
Editorial
Overview: Ethiopia
Somali Zone: Natural Resources small reserves of gold,
platinum, copper, potash, natural gas, hydropower. ;Somalia:
Natural Resources uranium and largely unexploited
reserves of iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper,
salt.;
Djibouti: Natural Resources geothermal areas.;
Eritrea: Natural Resources gold,
potash, zinc, copper, salt, possibly oil and natural
gas, fish.
Many
years ago, when I was the agriculture and county
government reporter for The
Herald-Journal in Logan, Utah, a Somali
acquaintance of mine – we both regularly attended the
tiny Logan
Islamic Center – sat me down one morning and
decided to explain to me the why's and wherefore's of
his country's collapse into civil war in the early
1990s.
I
wish I could remember his name. He was one of several
Somali students working on advanced degrees in either
agricultural engineering or irrigation at Utah
State University. I knew a thing or two about
Somalia, having worked as a reporter in Dubai the year
before (1995). In that tiny Gulf state, I acquired a few
Somali acquaintances who taught me that despite the
civil war and the collapse of the central government in
Mogadishu, there was still a brisk trade between the
Gulf and Somalia, and every now and then I'd sit at the
boat launches along Dubai creek and watch the dhows from
Somalia unload their cargoes of livestock (goats or
sheep) or fish and load up with goods no one else was
willing to ship to the Horn of Africa at that time –
auto parts, gasoline and lubricants, air conditioners,
power generators, household goods and kitchen
appliances.
I
do remember it was a bright morning, and we sat in the
sunlight in that little mosque he revealed his take on
his country's recent history. Beginning in 1969, Somalia
was ruled by a dictator, Mohammed
Siad Barre, a sometime client of the Soviet Union
and a sometime friend of Washington, depending on who
ruled Ethiopia at the time and who he could get the most
money and greatest amount of political and military
support from.
It
never really mattered who the patron of the moment was,
because Siad Barre's ruling method never changed. He
created as strong a cult of personality as he could and
as brutal a police state as possible, given Somalia's
meager resources. But more importantly, my friend told
me, he made sure that there simply was no "public
space" not somehow connected to the state, no
voluntary organizations or ways of doing things – no
matter how old or traditional – that were not
approved, monitored and funded by the state and, by
implication, Siad Barre.
In
short, he said, no one could form so much as a bowling
league without the party/leader state's stamp of
approval and constant monitoring, lest the frivolities
somehow become a conduit for anti-state activities.
Anyone who tried was at best threatened and the
organization broken up. At worst, they were killed.
The
only institution which Siad Barre couldn't integrate
into the party/leader state were Somalia's extensive
clans (he was able to only partially co-opt the
country's Islamic institutions). But he could force
himself in-between the clans and make sure they couldn't
work with each other outside the confines of the
party/leader state. And he could make sure that clans
had to compete with each other for party/leader state
resources and attention.
My
friend told me that several things forced the eventual
uprising. First, as the Cold War ground to a halt, the
Horn of Africa simply no longer mattered, so no one was
willing to do anything to help poor Siad Barre hold on
to power. (Remember, there was a time when it did, when
Moscow happily supplied Somalia with weapons and
advisers to battle the pro-Western government of Halie
Selassie, and then Washington came to Mogadishu's aid to
fight Ethiopian and Cuban troops after the Dergue seized
power in Addis Abbaba in a 1975 coup; it was an era when
people like Paul Wolfowitz lost sleep over the big
Soviet navy base on the Yemeni island of Socotra, off
the Somali coast.) Without the outside guarantee of
survival, Siad Barre was on his own.
Second,
my friend also said that Somalis increasingly concluded
that if simply wanting to start a sports club, Qur'an
study group, or agricultural improvement organization
without government approval and help meant the state
treated you as an enemy, then you might as well make
being an enemy of the state count. And so Somalis who
felt they had no choice joined the rebellion against
Siad Barre. It grew and, as things like this usually do,
succeeded in ousting the dictator and destroying his
state.
A
few years later, as I slogged through my MA
in Arab Studies at Georgetown, I learned this was
actually an established and somewhat well-understood
political phenomenon. And it's widely practiced in the
Middle East – Libya is a great example of a
party/leader state, but Saddam's Iraq (and likely the
Iraq currently evolving out of the collapse of the Iraqi
wing of the Ba'ath Party) and Ba'ath Syria are also
exceptional examples of what happens when every type of
collective social activity has to be plugged into and
through the state.
(This
led eventually to many discussions of what kind of chaos
will engulf places like Libya and Iraq when their
leaders, ruling parties, and states are destroyed. Not
whether or not there would be chaos, but what kind of
chaos.)
Now,
when pointy-headed types talk about things like bowling
leagues, prayer circles and mutual agricultural
improvement associations, they call it "civil
society." (When I think of "civil
society," I tend to think of overweight Midwestern
salesmen-types in funny hats raising money for cataract
surgeries or new bandstands in the municipal park, and I
rather doubt this is what George
Soros means when he says "civil society.")
But the idea (mine, anyway, I won't pretend to speak for
Soros) is that there are "social spaces" where
people can work together absent the involvement of the
state. Absent the approval of the state. Absent the need
for the state.
It's
how most human being have lived, worked, worshiped and
traded for most of the last 10,000 years.
Now,
why bring all this up?
I
was riding
my bicycle to work
the other morning, contemplating, as I usually do, the
events of the day. I was trying to make sense of the
Bush Administration's many seemingly disconnected
initiatives – faith-based initiatives, no child left
behind, social-security "reform," the
so-called ownership society – and trying to figure out
how they all made sense together.
And
that's when I remembered Somalia.
All
of the Bush Administration's varied ideas and programs
make sense if you understand that they route large
portions of the US economy through something that is
beginning to look a lot like a party/leader state. At
first glance, it all seems so convenient. The banks and
the government work together to help people buy homes!
How nice! It's win-win. People get homes of "their
own," banks get guaranteed business, jobs get
created. And what better way to ensure proper
ideological control and political loyalty of the
country's schools, churches and big businesses by
hooking them up to large intravenous bags of unearned
federal cash?
Now,
to be fair, there's already nearly 100 years of federal
intervention in the economy to build on, from small
business loans to the 30-year mortgage (federal support
for the banking system) to social security itself and
aid to college students and universities. We live in an
America where it's already very difficult to conduct
business without somehow having the federal government
(or even state and local governments) involved. But it
is still possible if you work hard enough. And can work
with others who share your views.
If
you think this looks like welfare, well, it is, but not
quite the way you think. The federal government, as part
of the "ownership society," may back
low-interest loans and reduced down payments for folks
to buy houses, but do you think there will be any
federal help for borrowers if time get tough and people
can no longer make their mortgage payments? Not on your
life. No more than there is federal support for college
grads who default on their student loans. But all the
loans will be guaranteed by the government –
regardless of whether borrowers can repay or not –
ensuring continued "profitability" for banks
willing to share some of that gain with the party/leader
state in the form of political donations and support.
And
to its everlasting shame, American
"capitalism" has almost always been willing to
sell itself for a government handout, a government
contract, a government subsidy, a loan guarantee.
(That's the American System!) It will continue to do so,
because too many businessmen would rather have, as part
of what George F. Will (in one of his more lucid
moments) aptly said, "socialized risk and
privatized profits." Why actually work for
something when Uncle Sugar is willing to tax and borrow
to boost the bottom line?
I've
long wondered what tyranny in US would look like. We're
not there yet, despite the constant hyperventilating of
some to the contrary. The Bush Administration rather
sits atop the state in much the same way Napoleon III
sat atop his – more potential tyrant than kinetic.
Team Bush lacks the imagination and nerve necessary for
real tyranny. It views the state merely as a thing to
loot, to hand over to one's friends in great big sloppy
globs because there are no real consequences attached.
It is something you trash in a drunken, drug-ridden
spree and laugh about the hazy half-memories the morning
after. And nothing more. Because the bills are always
paid by someone else.
But
I truly believe that tyranny is coming, and that we will
indeed be a fortunate people if it passes us by without
paying us a visit. Somewhere, people with real
imagination and the desire to run the state are lurking,
waiting for the opportunity, for their moment to come.
All the laws are written, the machinery is in place, the
paramilitary police are ready to take orders, the civil
service ready to count beans and work efficiently and
accomplish many great things. It won't be a mass tyranny
of parties and rallies and militias and uniforms. It
won't be a tyranny most raised on fear of fascism will
recognize. Most Americans won't even feel the heel of
the boot when it starts marching (because that's how
tyranny works). They are as free as the want to be, free
to wave to flag, to love the government, to support the
troops, to pray for the President and thank God for
America. That "freedom" won't change.
But
it will be tyranny. I can imagine an America, in the
not-too-distant future, where it will be virtually
impossible, and likely even criminal, to get a home
loan, rent an apartment, to attend school, start a
business, get a job or possibly even form a bowling
league without first getting some kind of government
approval. I can see an America where it is impossible to
engage in any kind of unsupervised, voluntary
cooperation with anyone. I can see an American tyranny
that would, in effect, require what amounts to a
security clearance for all kinds of things – to buy a
car, borrow money, get a master's degree or PhD to
getting certain kinds of "public sector" or
"private sector" (when we start talking
"sectors," then we are really only talking
about types of government, rather than state and
non-state) jobs. No need to randomly arrest folks for
badmouthing the leader or saying naughty things about
the government. Just put it in the record, and make them
ineligible to refinance their mortgage at the favorable
terms given to loyal supporters of the leader! Put a
black mark on their employment record, ensuring they
will be the first fired and never hired once the economy
"picks up."
And
if they need a handout after being fired from their
jobs? Why, make sure they can only get charity from a
proper, state-sanctioned church and only after signing a
loyalty oath. A man must, after all, eat.
A
friend cautioned me on this, saying I ought to be
careful when applying a Middle East model to our
society. True, there are many significant cultural and
historical differences. But all men are sinners and have
fallen short of the glory of God. Wealth, culture and
history do not insulate a people from foolishness. Or
the consequences of their actions.
Okay,
I admit: I am a pessimist. We may avoid this fate, the
fate of so many societies run by tyrants who seek to
aggrandize and create the unending dictatorship, and
instead simply muddle through. I surely hope so. (That's
not so bad, because it is what people have done for most
of the last 10,000 years.) But most days, I am inclined
to doubt it. We are likely in for a future of war,
privation and no small amount of suffering. Followed by
chaos. If, however, Somalia shows what lengths a tyrant
is willing to use the state, it also shows that once
people decide to fight the state, it will eventually
lose. No tyranny is forever. And that, no matter what
happens, is reason to hope.
Charles
H. Featherstone is the assistant editor of The
Oil Daily, a specialist in the Middle East and
Islam, an avid cyclist and an apprentice bicycle
mechanic. He lives with his wife Jennifer in Alexandria,
Virginia.
| |
There are
Strategic Mining and Oil in
Somalia
By Hassan
Ali Hussein, Ph.D.
 |
| The
US and UK Oil firm: They did and
Accurate mineral exploration in Somalia,
since 1954 |
It is not easy to answer
the above question without understanding the
geology of
Somalia
and surrounding regions (e.g.
Ethiopia
,
Sudan
, Yemen etc) where gold is currently mined.
Most of the African
continent has been tectonically stable from orogenic
episodes since about 500 million years ago. The Neoproterozoic
(Pan African) orogenic
episode have led to differentiate the continent
into two major features: (i)
cratons which have
not suffered major orogenic
deformation and metamorphism and (ii) mobile
belts made up of rocks which are stable since
550 millions ago (Vail, 1985).
Somalia
is a part of the Arabian-Nubian Shield (ANS)
that underlies several countries, mainly
Sudan
,
Saudi Arabia
,
Ethiopia
,
Eritrea
,
Yemen
and
Egypt
. These different areas during the Neoproterozoic,
share a very similar geological evolution
(accretion of volcanic island arcs) with mineral
deposits formed by similar processes
(epithermal, mesothermal,
VMS gold deposits)
In view of
geological and geotectonic setting of Somalia
(especially northern region), it is broadly
similar to that of surrounding regions where
Neoproterozoic rocks
(low- to high grade meta-sedimentary and
meta-volcanic rocks) record a succession of mild
collision, which resulted from the successive
accretion of island arcs. The earlier generation
of gold mineralization in those regions formed
in an island arc setting related to the waning
stage of tectono
volcano activity. Consequently, during Pan
African orogeny that
induced regional deformation, metamorphism, magmatism,
collision of micro plates and crustal
thickening, gold has been remobilized and reconcentrated
either in the zones of metamorphic permeabilities
and in collapse breccias (Hussein, 1999).
Gold mineralization in the
above mentioned regions occurs in different
forms corresponding to different geological
environment and at least three types are
present:
a) Premetamorphic
mineralization associated with stratiform
massive sulfide deposit, e.g
Northeast Sudan
.
b) Gold mineralization
related to the regional tectono-metamorphic
episode. E.g. North East
Sudan,
West Saudi Arabia
.
c) Gold mineralization
related to shear zones, e.g. South Ethiopia,
West Saudi Arabia,
Eritrea
, North East Sudan.
According to my knowledge,
systematic geological mapping using satellite
images/remote sensing, detailed litho-stratigraphic
classification and accurate mineral exploration
had never been conducted in Somalia, except,
preliminary exploration work done by Russian
geologists in the early seventies. Their works
mainly consisted of some geochemical exploration
studies in different part of
Somalia
searching mineral deposits including gold.
Equally, UNDP had done several geological and
geochemical investigations in the north
Somalia
in early eighties. However, it has been
discovered several base metals and gold
occurrences in north
Somalia
.
Related Article written by Eng. Abdulkadir
Abiikar Hussein, MSc.; FGS (Engineering
Geologist)- 05/2001
No doubt, Somalia has precious metals
including gold, zinc, silver but I strongly
suggest a detailed investigation for gold
and sulfides metallic over meta-sedimentary and
meta-volcanic rocks has to be performed. The
investigation should be included a detailed
geological mapping using Landsat imagery and
GIS. Unfortunately, the above geological tasks
can not be carried out unless the current
chronic instability and violence in Somali halt
and Somalis bring peace and flexible solutions.
However, the growing Somali higher institutions
can establish geosciences faculty and take
responsibilities of collecting and archiving all
previous geological data about the nation. They
can also carry out and organize workshops and
seminars on the Somali minerals, water and
environmental issues in close contact and
cooperation with international universities,
organizations and local NGO's.
Hassan Ali Hussein,
Ph.D.
E-mail: has59@hotmail.com
Reference
Hussein, H.A.
1999: Application of Geochemical
Parameters at Gebeit
Gold Mine Area, NE Sudan- Ph.D. thesis 164pp,
Technical University of Berlin, Germany.
Vail, J. R.
1983: Pan-African (late Precambrian)
tectonic terrains and the reconstruction of the
Arabian-Nubian Shield. Geology,
13, 839-842,
Boulder
. |

Contact
at nurkafi@geeskaafrika.com
(Managing Editor/Publisher) |
|
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
| The
Horn of Africa Oil and GAS:
Information
contained in this report is the best available as of
March 2003 and is subject to change.
DJIBOUTI
The French Territory of the Somali Coast became
Djibouti in 1977. In November 1991, the mainly
Afar-supported Front for the Restoration of Unity and
Democracy (FRUD) began fighting the Somali majority
government. French peacekeeping forces were sent to help
stop the fighting in early 1992, and FRUD signed a peace
accord with the government in December 1994, ending the
conflict. As Djibouti geared up for the 1997 general
elections, dissident FRUD rebels attacked and fought
government troops in the north. In February 2000,
another faction of FRUD signed a peace accord with the
government. On May 12, 2001, President Ismail Omar
Guelleh presided over the signing of what is termed the
final peace accord officially ending the decade-long
civil war between the government and the armed faction
of the FRUD. France maintains one of its largest
military bases outside France in Djibouti. France has
some 2,700 troops as well as warships, aircraft and
armored vehicles in the country.
Djibouti's main economic asset
is its strategic location. The city of Djibouti, capital
and home to nearly two-thirds of the country's
population, is a major transshipment port and bunkering
facility. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad is the only
line serving central and southeastern Ethiopia. Business
increased at Djibouti's port when hostilities between
Eritrea and Ethiopia closed Ethiopian access to the
Eritrean port of Assab. Djibouti became the only
significant port for landlocked Ethiopia, handling all
its imports and exports during the war. The city of
Djibouti has the only paved airport in the country. Its
relatively good transport infrastructure also enables
several landlocked African countries to fly in their
goods for re-export. This earns Djibouti much-needed
transit taxes and harbor fees.
Djibouti's real gross domestic
product (GDP) is expected to again grow 1.6% in 2002,
following estimated growth of 1.6% in 2001, and 0.7% in
2000. An unemployment rate of 40% to 50% continues to be
a major problem for Djibouti's economy. Inflation, which
is expected to fall to 2.0% in 2002, has averaged over
2.4% annually for the last two years. Inflation is not a
concern, however, because of the fixed peg of the
Djiboutian franc to the US dollar. In November 2001, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the second
disbursement of funds from a Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF) signed with Djibouti in 1999.
OIL
There is currently no upstream (exploration or
production) oil activity in Djibouti. The downstream oil
sector is an important aspect of Djibouti's economy,
given the role the capital city plays as a significant
regional bunkering and refueling facility. Three
companies, ExxonMobil, Shell and TotalFinaElf, handle
refueling at Djibouti's port. The companies, along with
ChevronTexaco, also distribute and market petroleum
products in the country. Total storage capacity at the
port facility is 1.26 million barrels (200,000 cubic
meters). The Dubai Ports Authority (DPA) was awarded a
20-year contract in June 2000 to manage the port. DPA
hopes to increase Djibouti's handling capacity from
125,000 metric tons to 300,000 metric tons per year and
to make it the leading transshipment point on the
African continent. Planned port expansion and
modernization will also entail an upgrade to the
petroleum receiving and storage facilities. Two-thirds
of the port's trade comes from Ethiopia, which stopped
using Assab in Eritrea when the two countries went to
war in 1998. Ethiopian oil imports through Djibouti
nearly doubled in 1999 following the outbreak of war.
POWER
Djibouti currently has installed electricity generating
capacity of 85 megawatts (MW), all of which is thermal
(oil-fired). In January 2001, U.S.-based Geothermal
Development Associates (GDA) announced that it had
completed a feasibility study on the development of a
30-MW geothermal power plant in Djibouti. The study,
which commenced in August 2000, established the
commercial viability of the proposed generating
facility. The $115-million plant, to be located in the
Lake Assal region west of the capital, will be
constructed on the build own operate (BOO) financing
scheme. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF), a joint
initiative of the World Bank and the United Nations
(UN), has approved a $3 million financing package to pay
for the drilling of three production-sized assessment
wells. GDA anticipates signing a power purchase
agreement with state-owned utility Electricite de
Djibouti (EDD) by the end of 2001. EDD, which plans to
remove aging diesel-fired generating units when the
project begins operations, forecasts expanding the Assal
geothermal facility to meet growing demand for
electricity. The plant is expected to have a capacity of
100 MW by 2015.
ERITREA
In 1952, a UN resolution federating the former Italian
colony of Eritrea with Ethiopia went into effect. In
1962, Emperor Haile Selassie unilaterally dissolved the
Eritrean parliament and annexed the country. The
Eritrean fight for independence continued even after
Haile Selassie was ousted in a coup in 1974. A 30-year
struggle for independence ended in 1991, with Eritrean
rebels defeating the governmental forces led by Mengistu
Haile Miriam. In May 1991, the Eritrean People's
Liberation Front (EPLF) established the Provisional
Government of Eritrea (PGE) to administer Eritrean
affairs until a referendum was held on independence and
a permanent government established. EPLF leader Isaias
Afwerki became the head of the PGE, and the EPLF Central
Committee served as its legislative body. On April
23-25, 1993, Eritreans voted overwhelmingly for
independence from Ethiopia in a UN-monitored free and
fair referendum. The Eritrean authorities declared
Eritrea an independent state on April 27, 1993. The
government was reorganized and after a national, freely
contested election, the National Assembly, which chose
Isaias as President of the PGE, was expanded to include
both EPLF and non-EPLF members.
Relations between Ethiopia and
Eritrea began to deteriorate soon afterwards. When
Eritrea and Ethiopia separated amicably in 1993, several
border issues remained unresolved. In November 1997, a
border commission between the two countries was
established, but no progress on the delineation of the
countries' boundaries was made. Fighting broke out
between the two countries in May 1998 over the disputed
Badme region. Eritrea seized Badme and two other areas
of previously Ethiopian-administered territory. In
February 1999, Ethiopia seized back the border area of
Badme. Following a breakdown in talks, Ethiopia, in May
2000, launched a series of attacks to recover the
remaining areas seized in 1998. In June 2000, both sides
accepted an Organization of African Unity (OAU) peace
proposal. The peace plan includes troop withdrawals back
to the previous border, a 15.5-mile-wide (25 kilometer)
security zone monitored by UN forces, and the eventual
demarcation of the border. The formal treaty ending the
war was signed on December 12, 2000.
Growth of the Eritrean economy
was hampered by the war. Eritrea's real GDP growth in
the two years prior to the conflict averaged 7.4%. Real
GDP growth fell to 4.0% in 1998, 0.0% in 1999 and -1.0%
in 2000. With the cessation of hostilities, real GDP
growth of 1.0% is expected in 2001, and a return to
prewar real GDP growth of 7.5% is forecast for 2002.
Inflation, which reached 27% in 2000, declined to 15% in
2001, and is expected to be around 5% in 2002.
Multilateral and bilateral donors have pledged nearly
$132 million towards the demobilization of 200,000
Eritrean soldiers. Donor development funding is seen as
crucial in the improvement of the country's economy.
OIL
Hydrocarbon exploration, primarily offshore in the Red
Sea, began in the 1960's when Eritrea was still
federated with Ethiopia. In 1995, Eritrea signed a
production sharing contract (PSC) with U.S.-based
Anadarko Petroleum (Anadarko) for the offshore Zula
Block. Anadarko signed a second PSC for the offshore Edd
Block, located south of the Zula Block, in September
1997. Anadarko announced, in December 1997, that it had
reached an agreement with ENI/Agip (Agip) to swap
interests in exploration acreage. Anadarko received a
25% interest in a Tunisian block operated by Agip, and
Agip received a 30% share in the 6.7-million acre Zula
Block and 30% interest in the Edd Block. Burlington
Resources, a U.S.-based independent, later joined the
consortium by acquiring a 20% interest in both acreages.
Anadarko's first two exploration wells, both drilled on
the Zula Block, were unsuccessful. In January 1999, a
third dry well, Edd-1 on the Edd Block, was drilled.
Citing the disappointing exploration results, Anadarko
and its partners ceased exploration activities and
relinquished their rights to the offshore blocks.
In May 2001, U.S.-firm CMS
Energy signed an exploration agreement with Eritrea. The
agreement grants CMS Energy exploration rights on the
nearly 14,000-square kilometer (onshore and offshore)
Dismin Block in northeastern Eritrea.
Bab el-Mandeb (Mandab)
The Bab el-Mandeb is a narrow waterway situated between
Eritrea, Djibouti and Yemen that connects the Red Sea
with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. In 2000, it
was estimated that more than 3 million barrels per day
(bbl/d) of oil flowed through the Bab el-Mandeb.
Disruptions or closure of the Bab el-Mandeb could keep
tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez
Canal/Sumed Pipeline complex, diverting them around the
southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope). This
would add greatly to transit time and cost, and
effectively tie up spare tanker capacity. The Bab el-Mandeb
could be bypassed (for northbound oil traffic) by
utilizing the East-West oil pipeline, which traverses
Saudi Arabia and has a capacity of about 4.8 million
bbl/d. However, southbound oil traffic would still be
blocked. In addition, closure of the Bab el-Mandeb would
effectively block non-oil shipping from using the Suez
Canal, except for limited trade within the Red Sea
region.
In December 1995 and again in
August 1996, Eritrean and Yemeni forces clashed over
control of the Hanish Islands, located just north of the
Bab el-Mandeb. In October 1996, the two countries signed
an agreement over the islands. The two sides agreed to
put their case before an international court of
arbitration (Permanent Court of Arbitration-PCA). The
court will then issue two rulings; one on who has
sovereignty over the disputed area, and one on the
demarcation of the two sides' maritime boundary. In
October 1998, the PCA ruled that the Hanish Islands are
subject to the territorial sovereignty of Yemen. In
December of 1999, the PCA issued its ruling on the
maritime boundary.
Downstream and Refining
Eritrea has crude refining capacity of 18,000 bbl/d, but
the refinery located in the Red Sea port of Assab has
been shutdown since 1997 due to the high operating and
maintenance costs. Ethiopia and Eritrea, joint operators
of the facility, decided to close the Assab refinery in
August 1997 and import refined petroleum products to
meet domestic needs.
Eritrea's petroleum consumption
was estimated at 8,000 bbl/d in 2000. Marketing and
distribution of petroleum products is performed by
ExxonMobil, Shell and TotalFinaElf. In June 2000, Shell
purchased the downstream operations of Agip in several
African countries including Eritrea and Ethiopia. The
Eritrean assets included service stations, two petroleum
product depots and an LPG (liquefied petroleum gas)
filling station.
In August 2000, Sudan's National
Petroleum Company announced plans to lay pipelines to
supply Eritrea and Ethiopia with petroleum products from
its Khartoum refinery. Sudan already exports oil to
other fellow members of COMESA (Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa). Under COMESA, trade within
the zone is not subject to tariffs, which means that
Sudanese oil likely will be cheaper for COMESA members
than other alternatives.
ELECTRICITY
Eritrea has approximately 60 MW of diesel-fired
generating capacity. The Eritrean Electricity Authority
(EEA) handles generation, transmission and distribution
of electricity. In 1997, South Korean firms Daewoo and
Hanjung signed an agreement to build a heavy oil-fired
plant in at Hirgigo, just outside of Massawa. The plant,
which was nearly completed, was damaged in a bombing
raid by Ethiopia in 2000. In April 2001, the governments
of Eritrea and the United Arab Emirates signed a loan
agreement for the facility's repair. Saudi Arabia and
Eritrea signed a $16.6 million loan agreement in
September 2001. The loan will be used for infrastructure
improvements including electricity generation.
Electricity is only available in
Eritrea's larger cities and towns, leaving about 80% of
the Eritrean population without access to electricity.
Some smaller villages have community diesel generators
which can provide small amounts of electricity to
households. Photovoltaic (PV) electricity generation is
being used in special applications throughout the
country. Twenty-six rural health centers are each
supplied with 2-kilowatt (kW) solar photovoltaic power
systems for refrigeration, lighting, operating theaters,
fans, and laboratory equipment. Additionally, the
majority of the 140 rural clinics are equipped with
solar powered vaccine refrigerators. Approximately 3%
(about 60 villages) of Eritrea's villages have been
supplied with PV systems (0.8 to 1.2kW) to power water
pumps to supply drinking water. Each system serves a
minimum of 300 households. Over 70 rural schools (out of
700) have been provided with PV systems for lighting and
power.
ETHIOPIA
Ethiopia is the oldest independent country in Africa and
one of the oldest in the world. Unique among African
countries, Ethiopia maintained its freedom from colonial
rule, except during the Italian occupation of 1936-41.
In 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed Emperor
Haile Selassie, who had ruled since 1930, and
established a socialist state. The Derg was toppled by a
coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), in 1991. A
constitution was adopted in 1994 and Ethiopia's first
multiparty elections were held in 1995. A two-year
border war with Eritrea ended when a peace treaty was
signed in December 2000.
Ethiopia's economy is primarily
agrarian, with the agricultural sector accounting for
45% of GDP and 80% of the workforce. Coffee, Ethiopia's
primary export crop, accounted for 58% of total exports
in 1999, and has averaged two-thirds of all export
earnings over the last 20 years. Other important
agricultural exports include qat (khat), a mild
stimulant from the leaves of the Catha Edulis shrub,
pulses, oilseeds, live animals and hides. Ethiopia's
real GDP growth averaged 5% from 1996 to 2000. Real GDP
growth of 7.3% is estimated for 2001, and is forecast at
6.8% for 2002. It is estimated that consumer prices fell
6.8% in 2001.The decline is a result of improved grain
harvests. Inflation is expected to average 5.1% in 2002.
Continued donor support is seen
as the crucial element in Ethiopia's economic reform and
poverty reduction strategies. In 1998, the IMF approved
a $42 million loan under its Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF). Earlier in the year the
World Bank approved $500 million in loans for Ethiopia's
power and transportation sectors. Following the outbreak
of hostilities with Eritrea, the IMF and World Bank
suspended new lending to Ethiopia. The suspension was
lifted after the signing of the peace accord in December
2000. The World Bank approved a $400 million loan to
finance emergency recovery, military demobilization and
reintegration projects. In July 2001, the IMF approved a
$112 million PGRF to support Ethiopia's economic
program. In November 2001, the IMF and World Bank
announced that Ethiopia was eligible for a $1.9 billion
debt relief package under the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) Initiative, becoming the 24th country
to qualify for debt relief under the HIPC's enhanced
framework. The savings in debt service resulting from
the HIPC are substantial, amounting to about $96 million
per year on average until 2021. The resources made
available by debt relief provided under the HIPC will be
allocated to key anti-poverty programs. Poverty-targeted
expenditures are projected to increase steadily, from
10.9% of GDP in 2001, to 14.7% in 2002, and 15.5% in
2003.
OIL AND GAS
Ethiopia's current proven hydrocarbon reserves are
minimal, but the potential to increase reserves to
commercial viability is seen as promising. The country's
geology is similar to that of its oil-producing
neighbors to the east (on the Arabian peninsula) and the
west (Sudan). In April 2001, the Ministry of Mines and
Energy reported that hydrocarbon seeps had been
discovered in several regions. The government plans to
conduct feasibility studies to establish the extent and
viability of the deposits.
Hydrocarbon exploration in
Ethiopia's Ogaden Basin began over eighty years ago
(Standard Oil in 1920). In 1972, U.S.-based Tenneco made
two natural gas discoveries, Calub and Hilala in the
Ogaden region. Tenneco relinquished the acreage, and the
Ethiopian government formed the Calub Gas Share Company
(CGSC) to develop the fields. In 1994, the World Bank
approved a $74 million loan to develop the Ogaden Basin
fields. The Ethiopian Privatization Agency (EPA) put up
the CGSC for privatization in 1998, but the EPA, citing
weak bids, withdrew the tender. In December 1999,
Houston-based Sicor announced that it had signed a
$1.4-billion joint-venture deal to develop the Calub
natural gas project. Under the terms of the agreement,
Gasoil Ethiopia Project (GEP), the joint-venture firm,
will acquire 95% of the CGSC under the Ethiopian
government's privatization law. Currently, 5% of the
CGSC is held by local private investors. The Ethiopian
government will hold a 20% interest in GEP with Sicor
holding the remaining share. GEP plans to construct a
375-mile, 24-inch pipeline to transmit natural gas to
the town of Awash, which is approximately 75 miles east
of the capital Addis Ababa. At Awash, plans call for
construction of a cryogenic liquids plant and two
gas-to-liquids process systems with capacity to process
200 million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d) of natural gas.
The end products will be synthetic fuels and
petrochemical feedstocks plus steam that will generate
electricity and help produce 20,000 bbl/d of potable
water. A planned refinery will produce products
including diesel, gasoline, kerosene and jet fuels. The
gas-to-liquids system will also produce some 500 tons of
ammonia per day as feedstock for a urea plant to be
constructed. It was announced in April 2000, that CGSC
and Sicor had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU).
The purpose of the agreement was to strengthen
oil-prospecting activities in the Calub and the Lalla
areas.
In 1989, U.S.-independent Hunt
Oil signed a PSC for the Genale River concession in the
Ogaden Basin.
In January 2001, the Ethiopian
government and Canada's Pinewood Resources (Pinewood)
signed a PSC to explore and develop the Gambela oil
concession located in the Gambela area of southwestern
Ethiopia bordering on Sudan. The concession encompasses
an area of 5,900-square miles (15,356-square
kilometers). No seismic data has been acquired or wells
drilled in the Gambela concession. In May 2001, Pinewood
announced that it had relinquished all rights to the
Gambela oil concession located in the Gambela region of
Ethiopia. Pinewood stated that it was unable to obtain
financing to develop the project.
Downstream
Ethiopia's petroleum consumption was estimated to be
22,000 bbl/d in 2000. With the closure of the Assab
refinery in 1997, Ethiopia is totally reliant on imports
to meet its petroleum requirements. Petroleum imports
are received at the port of Djibouti, and shipped via
rail and tanker truck to Ethiopia. The Ethio-Djibouti
Railway Company (jointly owned by Ethiopia and Djibouti)
plans to rehabilitate the railway between Djibouti-Addis
Ababa. This is part of a $40 million project which is
being funded by the European Union (EU). The project is
expected to begin in the first half of the year 2002 and
take two years to complete.
Sudan and Ethiopia signed an
agreement in June 2001, where Ethiopia will begin
importing Sudanese petroleum products. Imports are
expected to begin in early 2002, when the road linking
Gallabat in Sudan to Gondar, Ethiopia is completed.
Officials from the Ethiopian Petroleum Corporation (EPC),
the state-owned firm responsible for the country's
downstream operations, stated that as much as 85% of its
petroleum requirements will be met by Sudanese imports.
The EPC plans to build an oil depot in Sudan to
facilitate storage and transportation. It was reported
in November 2001, that the EPC would lease oil depots in
Khartoum until its storage facilities can be built.
Marketing and distribution of
petroleum products is performed by ExxonMobil, Shell and
TotalFinaElf. In June 2000, Shell purchased the
downstream operations of Agip in several African
countries including Ethiopia. The Ethiopian assets
included over 100 service stations, two depots and four
LPG filling plants.
ELECTRICITY
Ethiopia has approximately 456 MW of installed
generating capacity. The vast majority of Ethiopia's
existing capacity (83%) is hydroelectric. The Ethiopian
Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO), the state-owned firm
responsible for electricity generation, plans to
construct several new generating facilities to provide
electricity to Ethiopia. Currently, less than half of
Ethiopia's towns have access to electricity. Droughts
and repairs on several hydroelectric facilities have led
to power rationing to EEPCO's current customers.
In February 2001, EEPCO
announced that repair and maintenance work had been
completed at four hydroelectric facilities: Awash 1
& 2, Koka, and Tis Abay 1. U.S.-based Harza
Engineering (now MWH Global) is overseeing the
construction of an additional 34-MW unit at the Finchaa
hydroelectric facility in western Ethiopia. When
completed, the four-unit Finchaa dam will have a
capacity of 134 MW. The 73-MW Tis Abay 2 facility,
located on the Blue Nile (Abay) was expected to be
operational in 2001. Completion of the Finchaa expansion
and the Tis Abay 2 projects will increase Ethiopia's
generating capacity by nearly 25%.
EEPCO expects to have the Gilgel
Gibe hydroelectric facility online by mid-2003. Gilgel
Gibe, located on the Omo River in southwestern Ethiopia,
will have a generating capacity of 184 MW. The Ethiopian
government is funding $23 million of the $259 million
cost of the Gilgel Gibe project. The World Bank has
provided a $190 million loan, and another loan of $46
million has been granted by the European Investment
Bank. EEPCO plans to build Ethiopia's largest generating
facility at Tekeze. The 300-MW hydroelectric facility
will be located in northern Ethiopia. Germany's Lahmeyer
has been commissioned to conduct feasibility studies on
three potential hydroelectric sites in Ethiopia: a
195-MW scheme at Beles, 370-MW facility at
Halele-Werabesa and a 440-MW plant at Chemoga-Yeda.
Construction of Ethiopia's first
Independent Power Project (IPP) was set to commence in
early 2002. The Gojeb IPP will consist of a 150-MW
hydroelectric facility in western Ethiopia. The project
is being developed by Mohammed International Development
Research Organization & Companies (Midroc). When
completed, Midroc will sell the output from Gojeb to
EEPCO. It was reported in December 2001, that
construction of the Gojeb facility was being delayed due
to the lack of a signed purchase power agreement (PPA)
between Midroc and the government. Details and signing
of the PPA were expected to be completed in the first
quarter of 2002.
Agreements on additional IPP
projects were signed in June 2001. EEPCO and Italy's
ENERCO signed a MOU for the construction of three power
plants in the country. The Bilbi Moya plant will be a
75-MW coal-fired plant. Bilbi Moya will utilize local
coal deposits for fuel. The planned Awash 4
hydroelectric facility will have generating capacity of
40 MW. The largest facility will be the 162-MW Genale
hydroelectric facility located on the border between the
Oromia Region and the Southern Peoples Nationalities
Regional State. The plants will be built under the
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) system. ENERCO will operate
the facilities for 30 years, which would be renewable
for another 30 years.
In April 2001, Ethiopia signed
agreements to export electricity to neighboring Djibouti
and Sudan. Exports are expected to begin in 2004,
following the interconnection of the countries electric
grids.
SOMALIA
The Somali Republic gained independence on July 1, 1960.
Somalia was formed by the union of British Somaliland
and Italian Somaliland. Fighting erupted with Ethiopia
in 1964 over the Ogaden region, which Somalia claims. A
socialist state was established following a coup led by
Major General Muhammad Siad Barre. Somalia helped Somali
region (Ethiopia) region in 1978 but was defeated by
Ethiopian forces. Skirmishes between the two countries
continued into the early 1980s. Rebel forces ousted the
Barre regime in 1991, but turmoil, factional fighting,
and anarchy ensued. The Somali National Movement (SNM)
gained control of the north, while in the capital of
Mogadishu and most of southern Somalia the United Somali
Congress achieved control.
In 1992, responding to the
political chaos and humanitarian disaster in Somalia,
the United States and other nations launched Operation
Restore Hope. The U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF),
was mandated to create an environment in which
assistance could be delivered to the Somali people.
UNITAF, which was a UN-sanctioned operation, was granted
the authority to use all necessary means, including
military force in the protection of humanitarian
assistance and other peace-enforcement operations.
Beginning in 1993, UNITAF was replaced by a UN
humanitarian effort, UNOSOM II, which included forces
from the United States. By March 1993, the potential for
mass starvation in Somalia had been overcome, but the
security situation remained fragile. On October 3, 1993
U.S. troops recieved significant casuualties (19 dead
over 80 others wounded) in a battle with Somali gunmen.
When the United States (in 1994) and the UN withdrew (in
1995) their forces from Somalia, after suffering
significant casualties, order still had not been
restored.
In May of 1991, the areas
controlled by SNM (the administrative regions of Awdal,
Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool) declared
itself as the independent Republic of Somaliland.
Although not recognized internationally, Somaliland has
maintained a stable existence. In 1998, the neighboring
regions of Bari and Nugaal declared themselves
independent as the Republic of Puntland. A Transitional
National Government (TNG) was created in October 2000 in
Arta, Djibouti during a conference that was attended by
a broad representation of Somali clans. The TNG has a
three-year mandate to create a permanent national Somali
government. The TNG does not recognize Somaliland or
Puntland as independent republics but so far has been
unable to reunite them with the unstable regions in the
south. A former official in the Barre regime, Abdikassim
Salad Hassan, was chosen as the president of the TNG.
Somalia's economy, one of the
world's least developed, has been further hampered by
the country's ongoing internal strife. Reliable economic
data is scarce, and the TNG cannot manage the national
economy while it struggles to gain control over the
country. Livestock production (cattle, goats &
sheep) is the mainstay and largest foreign exchange
earner of the Somali economy. An outbreak of Rift Valley
Fever (RVF) in southern Saudi Arabia and Yemen (the
first reported outside Africa) in September and October
2000 left dozens of people dead and hundreds infected.
As a consequence, six Gulf States - Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates
- have now banned livestock imports from nine African
countries, principally from the Horn of Africa. The
economic impacts of this ban are likely to be
devastating. A similar ban by Saudi Arabia, following a
RVF outbreak in 1998, saw the volume of livestock
exports tumble from the port of Berbera in Somaliland
from nearly three million head in 1997 to just over one
million in 1998 (roughly $100 million of lost exports).
Another significant portion of the Somali economy,
foreign remittances, have fallen significantly following
the U.S. government's closure of the Al-Barakat transfer
company and the freezing of its assets. Al-Barakat, the
largest money transfer company operating in Somalia's
informal banking sector, has been accused of
transferring funds on behalf of Osama bin Laden and the
Al-Qaida terrorist network. Remittances from abroad are
estimated to be $200-$500 million annually.
The TNG is in the process of
re-establishing Somalia's Central Bank. Somalia is
unable to receive IMF, and other multilateral aid due to
the lack of institutions/financial infrastructure in
place. Somaliland has established a Central Bank (and
issues its own currency), and Puntland's Central Bank
became operational in August 1999.
OIL AND GAS
Somalia has no proven oil reserves, and only 200 billion
cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves. Somalia
currently has no hydrocarbon production. Oil seeps were
first identified by Italian and British geologists
during the colonial era. Exploration activities were
focused in northern Somalia, and several foreign firms,
including Agip, Amoco, Chevron, Conoco and Phillips,
held concessions in the area. The firms all declared
force majeure following the collapse of the central
government.
Exploration activity remains
hindered by the internal security situation, and the
multiple sovereignty issues. In February 2001
TotalFinaElf signed an exploration agreement with the
TNG. The twelve-month agreement grants TotalFinaElf the
rights to explore in the Indian Ocean off southern
Somalia. Hassan Farah, TNG's Minister for Water and
Mineral Resources, stated that the government would
provide security during the exploration activities.
Several factional leaders have denounced the agreement,
and stated that the TNG did not have the authority to
sanction the agreement, nor the power to guarantee the
safety and security of the exploration operations.
In May 2001, Somaliland signed
an agreement with U.K.-registered Rovagold and two
Chinese firms, CPEC and CPC, for the right to explore
for oil. Dubai-based Zarara Energy also signed an
exploration agreement with Somaliland. The Somaliland
government has said it will honor, until they expire,
the existing contracts foreign companies signed with the
Barre regime that are in their territory. None of the
firms have resumed operations in Somaliland. Chinese
firms also have been reported to be involved in oil
exploration activities in Puntland.
Somalia's petroleum consumption
was an estimated 4,000 bbl/d in 2000. The organization
officially responsible for all petroleum product
distribution and retailing is the cooperative Iskash.
The state-owned Iraqsoma Refinery Corporation operated a
10,000-bbl/d refinery outside of Mogadishu, but it has
been inoperative since 1991. TotalFinaElf is involved in
the downstream sector in Somaliland. It rehabilitated
and manages the operations of the oil terminal in
Berbera, Somaliland's primary port. TotalFinaElf also
supplies fuel to airports located in Berbera and
Somaliland's capital of Hargeisa.
POWER
Somalia currently has installed electricity generating
capacity of 70 megawatts (MW), all of which is
diesel-fired. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica (ENEE) is
the entity responsible for generation, transmission and
distribution of electricity in Somalia. Electrical
infrastructure has been damaged and destroyed, and the
ongoing strife has hindered the development of new
electric resources. A planned hydroelectric facility on
the Juba River has been delayed due to the continued
fighting. Studies have indicated that the Horn of
Africa, especially Somalia, is a prime location for
harnessing wind for electricity generation. The
possibility of installing wind turbines to generate
electricity was included in the Government of Somalia's
Five-Year Development Plan. The plan called for the
installation of wind turbines, which would be connected
to the electricity grid of Mogadishu, and the
installation of autonomous wind energy systems in rural
areas. These plans were derailed following the ouster of
the Barre regime.
In October 2001, WorldWater
Corp., a U.S.-based water management and solar
engineering company, signed agreements with the TNG to
become the master consultant and contractor for all
water and energy programs in Somalia. Under the
three-year agreement WorldWater would develop, manage
and oversee contracting for the country's water
resources and incorporate renewable energy projects such
as solar power into Somalia's infrastructure. This
includes locating and managing groundwater sources in
municipal and rural areas, delivering water for drinking
and for irrigation using the WorldWater's solar pumping
systems and generating independent electricity with its
solar power systems.
Puntland, which has had success
in privatizing the operations of its water utility,
plans to privatize the electric sector. Bossaso,
Puntland's capital, has privatized its water services.
Under the management of the Golden Utility Management
Company (Gumco), the 19-mile (30-kilometer) Bossaso
Water Project has been extended to the outlying towns of
Gardo and Galkayo. Electricity privatization is next,
with Khalif Nur Ali, chairman of the Bossaso Water
Board, volunteering to lay the groundwork for
electricity.
|
Economic
and Demographic Indicators
|
|
Country
|
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 2000E
(Billions of U.S. $ -- PPP)
|
Real GDP Growth Rate, 2001 Estimate
|
Real GDP Growth Rate, 2002 Projection
|
Per Capita GDP, 2000E (PPP)
|
Population
2001E
(Millions)
|
| Djibouti |
$0.6
|
1.6%
|
1.6%
|
$1,300
|
0.46
|
| Eritrea |
$2.9
|
1.0%
|
7.5%
|
$710
|
4.30
|
| Ethiopia |
$39.2
|
7.3%
|
6.8%
|
$600
|
65.89
|
| Somalia |
$4.3
|
NA
|
NA
|
$600
|
7.49
|
| Regional
Total/Average |
$47.0
|
6.2%
|
6.2%
|
$610
|
78.14
|
Sources: Economist
Intelligence Unit; Central Intelligence Agency World
Factbook 2001; International Monetary Fund.
PPP=Purchasing Power Parity. NA=Not Available.
|
Energy
Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 1999
|
|
Country
|
Total Energy Consumption (Quadrillion
Btu)
|
Petroleum
|
Natural Gas
|
Coal
|
Nuclear
|
Hydro-
electric
|
Other Renewable Electric
|
Net Electricity Imports
|
Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Million metric
tons of carbon)
|
| Djibouti |
0.024
|
100.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.490
|
| Eritrea |
0.019
|
100.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.375
|
| Ethiopia |
0.054
|
69.6%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
30.4%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.740
|
| Somalia |
0.008
|
100.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.163
|
| Regional
Total/Average |
0.105
|
84.4%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
15.6%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
1.768
|
Source: Energy
Information Administration
Note: percentages may not add up to 100% due to
rounding.
|
Energy
Supply Indicators
|
|
Country
|
Crude Oil Reserves, 1/1/02 (Million
Barrels)
|
Natural Gas Reserves, 1/1/02 (Billion
Cubic Feet)
|
Coal Reserves (Million Short Tons)
|
Petroleum Production, 2001 (Thousand
Barrels Per Day)
|
Natural Gas Production, 1999 (Billion
Cubic Feet)
|
Coal Production, 1999 (Million Short
Tons)
|
Electric Generating Capacity, 1999 (Gigawatts)
|
Crude Oil Refining Capacity, 1/1/02
(Thousand Barrels Per Day)
|
| Djibouti |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0.09
|
0
|
| Eritrea |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0.06**
|
14.6
|
| Ethiopia |
0.428
|
880
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0.46
|
0
|
| Somalia |
0
|
200
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0.07
|
10.0
|
| Regional
Total |
0.428
|
1,080
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0.68
|
24.6
|
Source: Energy
Information Administration, ** Source U.S.
Geological Survey
This report was compiled by
Eng.Ahmad Yusuf, MA France, 1982 (Regional Oil and Gas
Expert) for Geeska Afrika Online using the sources
listed below. at: ahmedgeo@hotmail.com
Africa
Research Bulletin, Agence France Press, AP Worldstream,
BBC, Business Wire, CIA World Factbook 2001, Economist
Intelligence Unit, Energy Day, Financial Times,
Financial Times African Energy, International Monetary
Fund, Middle East Economic Digest, Middle East Executive
Reports, Oil and Gas Journal, Petroleum Economist,
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, PR Newswire, U.S. Energy
Information Administration, U.S. Geological Survey,
World Markets Online. |